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One of history's great ironies is that Marxism, a modem socialist doctrine
designed for the industrialized Western world, took its first and deepest roots in
the agrarian economies and politically feudal systems of pre-revolutionary Rus-
sia and China. Historians can only wonder whether Marx would have been
pleased or disappointed by this unforeseen victory of his own political theory.
One speculates further whether Marx would have been dismayed or relieved by
the most recent developments in the Soviet Union (USSR) and the People's
Republic of China (PRC). What would he have thought of the most recent
replacement of Lenin's statues with the political icons of the capitalist West, for
example the golden arches of the Moscow McDonalds, and the recently promul-
gated Frank Sinatra doctrine?' How would Marx have been struck by the sight of
the Goddess of Democracy statue erected by Chinese students in the spring of
1989, and would he have been moved by the now well-known footage of a lone
student defiantly blocking the path of a Liberation Army tank on Chang An
Avenue in June of that year? Moreover, how would Marx have viewed the recent
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1. Gennady Gerasimov, when questioned about the future of the Brezhnev doctrine, replied that
it was being replaced by the "Sinatra Doctrine." "You know the Frank Sinatra song, 'I Did It My
Way,' " said Gerasimov, "Hungary and Poland are doing it their way." From Commies to Capital-
ists; The Ruble Is Worthless in Trade; Its Devaluation May Move Soviets into World Economy,
Newsday, Oct. 27, 1989, at 80.
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attempts of the USSR and the PRC to move toward a market economy arguably
better suited to survival in the international economic system? Would he have
been troubled by the retrenchment of capitalist ideology or would he have been
self-assured that socialism really does presuppose capitalism?
One of the symptoms of profound change in the USSR and the PRC is that the
leaders of these modern nations increasingly are less preoccupied with what
Marx would have thought and more concerned with their own political and
economic survival. These two nations are not so much troubled by the threat of
political and military invasion from without, but rather by economic stultification
and social disintegration from within. The competition between the two countries
has expanded beyond one for status as the better socialist to one of a race for
integration into the global economy. 2 Both the USSR and the PRC now seem to
acknowledge that in order to preserve their political orders, they must become
economically competitive. 3 The two countries betray concern that the black
market may undermine central economic planning altogether and that the incon-
vertibility of local currency (Soviet rubles and Chinese renminbi (RMB)) may
leave the economy without the foreign capital and investment perceived as req-
uisite to economic development and modernization.
The legalization of the black market4 and the partial devaluation of local
currency provide the basic path to reconciling the potentially incompatible goals
of preserving socialism while competing in transnational markets with the United
States, Japan, and the European Economic Community (EEC). Promulgated to
2. The Soviet economist Oleg Bogomolov, a close adviser of Gorbachev, has been quoted as
saying that "for many decades, the Soviet Union tried to develop its economy in isolation from the
rest of the world. Today, we realize that this ideology was a mistake." Rowen, Convertible Ruble
Merely Petty Cash in Soviet Reform, Nov. 5, 1989, at HI. Reformist policymakers in Hungary and
Poland and the rest of the newly reformed Eastern Europe are also edging haltingly toward currency
convertibility. Currency Convertibility No Panacea for East-Bloc Economies, Reuter Bus. Rep.
(Reuters) (Oct. 30, 1989).
3. While in prerevolutionary times, and during the first ten years of the PRC, China drew
heavily on Soviet models and resources, the tables on the economic front appear to have turned in the
last few years. In years to come, the Soviets may benefit more from, than contribute to, Chinese
innovation and investment. For example, it was announced in the fall of 1988 that the PRC would
participate in a syndicate of western banks to extend a loan to the Bank of Foreign Affairs, Vneshek-
onombank, in the Soviet Union. Out of a total $50 million, China was expected to extend $5 million
to the Soviet bank. In 1986 the Bank of China joined an underwriting syndicate for a $100 million
floating rate bond issue by a Soviet bank, but this was its first participation in cofinancing a loan to
the Soviet Union. Bank of China to Cofinance Loan to Moscow, Kyodo News Serv. (Nov. 2, 1988).
China is also taking advantage of Soviet preoccupation with domestic problems to improve the
relations with Eastern Europe. Sharma, China: Boosting Socialist Ties with Yuan Diplomacy, Inter-
Press Service, Feb. 20, 1991. It has been suggested that China may even beat the Soviet Union to
the long-term goal of full convertibility. Yowell, Swap Center System to Expand-Changes in the
Foreign Exchange System may be Moving China Along the Road to Full Currency Convertibility,
CHINA Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 10.
4. Recent devaluation of local Chinese currency has made black market exchanges less prof-
itable. China's Black Market Money Changers Hit Hard Times, Reuters Lib. Rep. (Reuters), Aug.
3, 1990.
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address the problem of the black market and to revitalize the domestic econo-
mies, the Soviet Union's policy of perestroika and the PRC's establishment of
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are well known to the international community.
Less is known, however, about the PRC's establishment of foreign exchange
adjustment centers (Swap Centers) 5 and the USSR's recent devaluation of the
ruble, its foreign currency auctions, and its express commitment to establish
trading centers for foreign exchange. 6 The future role of the USSR and the PRC
on the world economic stage may partly hinge on the successful implementation
of these models. The PRC's Swap Center is the most developed model and thus
is the focus of this article.
The Swap Center, as established in the PRC, provides an excellent model for
partial devaluation of local currency, which is designed to starve the black
markets and to improve the trade balance by enhancing exports. While avoiding
the social costs of full devaluation, that is, those resulting from rampant infla-
tion, partial devaluation through the Swap Center model tends in theory to
enhance foreign trade in two respects. First, partial devaluation stimulates Chi-
nese exports by reducing the cost of those goods to foreign consumers. Second,
partial devaluation attracts more foreign capital investment in the development of
new export markets by allowing greater repatriation of profits to those investors.
Swap Centers also create a greater availability of foreign exchange for investors
who need it for their ongoing operations. However, in practice the task of
regulating Swap Centers is a more difficult matter.
This article provides an exposition of the Swap Center system in the PRC by
concentrating on the Beijing Swap Center (BSC), established in 1988, and by
providing comparative references to other Swap Centers: in particular, the Na-
tional Swap Center (NSC), also located in Beijing, and the Shanghai Swap
Center (SSC). The restrictions regulating the BSC provide a contrast to the
laissez-faire policies of Swap Centers in the SEZs and other Swap Centers in
cities throughout the country.
7
5. For example, the latest volume in Longman's series of guidebooks to conducting business in
China, Lawrence J. Graham's Foreign Exchange Controls and Strategies for the People's Republic
of China, has been criticized for only briefly mentioning the Swap Centers. Brecher, CHINA Bus. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 66. The establishment of Swap Centers has also been described as the creation
of a "grey market." China Admits to Dual Money Rate, Agence France Presse, Nov. 19, 1988.
6. See infra text section HI.
7. A note on sources: On July 27, 1989, the author met with both state and local officials of the
Administration of Exchange Control to discuss the use and regulation of Swap Centers for purposes
of selling and purchasing foreign exchange. On the state level, the author met with Mr. Wei Jian
Guang, head of one of the sections of the Exchange Rate Division of the State Administration of
Exchange Control (SAEC) and Ms. Li Nan of the National Exchange Adjustment Center, the NSC.
At the local level, the author met with Mr. Liu Chunming, Vice Chief of the Beijing Branch of the
SAEC, or the Beijing Administration of Exchange Control (BAEC). The BAEC is the approval
authority for the BSC, whereas the BSC is the trading unit of the BAEC.
The following analysis is based on the author's conversations with these officials, his subsequent
reading of the State and Shanghai Rules, and further library and periodical research. This article
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The BSC model is the most centrally regulated center to date. Its innovative
components reflect the PRC's attempt to attract foreign investment to serve
Chinese ends. The BSC model implements several features, including the further
development of a membership system, the ability to cap the market rate of
exchange, 8 restrictions on direct negotiations between buyers and sellers, the
delimitation of the purpose for which the foreign exchange may be used, and the
deterrence of speculation and arbitrage.
The following discussion of the rules and regulations of the Swap Center
system, and the BSC in particular, is organized below into five sections. Section
I provides some general background on Swap Centers, while section II focuses
on the rules and regulations pertaining to the use of the BSC and the NSC.
Section III discusses comparable foreign exchange policies and innovations in
the Soviet Union that make the implementation of Swap Centers potentially
desirable in that country. Finally, section IV reviews the most recent develop-
ments affecting the Swap Center system and concludes with a perspective on the
future of the Swap Center model.
I. The Swap Center System: General Background
A. WHAT ARE SWAP CENTERS?
Swap Centers are government institutions designed to facilitate and monitor
the exchange of foreign currency at values higher than the rates currently posted
by the State Administration of Exchange Control (SAEC). 9 Swap Centers were
attempts to piece together a consistent view of the Swap Center system based on those sources. The
review of the State and Shanghai Rules and the periodical literature officially confirms only part of
what is discussed. Much of the information, especially that pertaining to the BSC, is based entirely
on brief meetings with the local officials named above.
The literal nomenclature for the State Rules is the Several Rules of the People's Bank of China for
the Adjustment of Retained Foreign Exchange. State Rules art. 9 states: "These rules are meant for
internal trial implementation and not for public promulgation. Detailed measures for the implemen-
tation thereof shall be separately formulated by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Con-
trol." These rules have been translated with the aid of Coudert Brothers, Hong Kong, and have been
edited by the author.
8. Reportedly, freely fluctuating exchange rates have been established in Xiamen, Fuzhou, and
Shanghai. Fujian Foreign Exchange Center Initiates Open Trading, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News
Serv. (Xinhua News Agency) (Mar. 15, 1990). However, China Daily reported on Aug. 17, 1990,
that Shanghai was the only center allowing freely fluctuating rates of exchange as of Aug. 1, 1990.
China Daily further reported that transactions totalled $1.01 million on Aug. 2, $4.06 million on
Aug. 3, and a record level of $7.76 million on Aug. 6, 1990. The same article reported that in the
first half of 1990, $660 million passed through the Shanghai Swap Center, marking a 30% rise over
the same period in 1989. Major Step for Money Exchange Market, China Daily, Aug. 17, 1990, at
2 [hereinafter China Daily, Aug. 17, 1990].
9. The State Rules were drawn up
with a view to adjusting the surplus and shortage of the retained foreign exchange among governmental agencies,
army units, organizations. schools, state.owned and collectively owned enterprises and institutions (hereinafter
referred to as the "Units"), accelerating technological improvement and scientific research, improving the product
quality and economic results and increasing the foreign exchange earnings through export....
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established first in November 198510 to meet the PRC's needs for foreign cur-
rency by allowing artificially low rates of exchange to rise closer to market
levels. The rates in Swap Centers have been approximately 10 percent to 75
percent higher than the PRC's official rates," and thus have provided a greater
incentive for foreign, and some domestic, enterprises to trade foreign exchange
in order to meet their local financial obligations in Chinese RMB. 12
B. How DID SWAP CENTERS DEVELOP?
In the late 1950s, in order to reform China's foreign trade system and its price
structure, the PRC established foreign exchange "retention" systems for export-
ing enterprises. 13 Not until 1979, however, did the PRC introduce a comprehen-
sive system for foreign exchange credits in order to promote Chinese exports. 14
Although the post-1979 policies were implemented erratically and inconsistently
according to location and industry, these reforms reflected a general trend toward
greater flexibility and toward broadening access to foreign exchange privileges. 15
Under the 1979 system, the SAEC opened a foreign exchange credit account
for each exporting enterprise based on approximately 7-8 percent of its export
earnings. The central government and local administrative bureaus then seized
the balance of the earnings. ' 6 In theory, enterprises could use this credit for
approved imports. 17 In practice, however, the credit account proved an ineffec-
According to the Rules on the Management and Operation of Shanghai Exchange Swap Center (the
Shanghai Rules), the Shanghai Rules "are formulated in order to ensure the conformity of foreign
exchange transactions with the relevant laws, decrees and regulations of China, to protect lawful
trading and to establish a normal trading order."
The PRC has also issued Measures for Administering Foreign Exchange Invested Abroad, ap-
proved by the State Council on Feb. 5, 1989, and promulgated by the State Administration of
Exchange Control on Mar. 6, 1989. An unofficial English translation has been published by China
Daily, Regulations Governing Foreign Exchange Invested Overseas by China's Enterprises and
Institutions, China Daily, Mar. 13, 1989, Bus. Wkly., at 4.
10. Foreign Exchange Swapping Center-Sluggish Business, CHINA MARKET No. 11 (1988).
11. State Rules art. 3 provides: "In adjusting the reserved foreign exchange allowances, the
allowance of one United States dollar is temporarily set for one renminbi (RMB). The State Ad-
ministration of Foreign Exchange Control may make further adjustment of the rate in accordance with
the supply and demand of the State's foreign exchange reserve." At the time the BSC and NSC were
established the legal exchange rate was RMB 3.7:U.S. $1. Since then, local currency has been twice
devalued, first to RMB 4.72:U.S. $1, China Daily, Oct. 27, 1990, and then in November 1990 to
RMB 5.22:U.S. $1. Business Asia, Dec. 3, 1990, at 419.
12. On Mar. 31, 1990, the buying and selling prices of U.S. $1 ranged from RMB 5.7 in
Shanghai to RMB 6.0 in Xiamen and Shenzhen, and remained at slightly lower levels at the time of
this writing. CHINA ECONOMIC NEWS, vol. I1, No. 49, Dec. 17, 1990, at 8-9.
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tive export incentive because approval procedures and restrictions on account
utilization made the process cumbersome and time-consuming. 18
In 1980, the PRC also developed a mechanism allowing some enterprises to
trade foreign exchange through the Bank of China's Trust and Investment Con-
sultants Co. at the official exchange rate. 19 However, the unattractively low rate
of exchange, coupled with an additional 10 percent commission, inhibited broad
participation by sellers of foreign exchange in this market. 20
Then, in the beginning of 1981 the PRC introduced an internal exchange rate
of RMB 2.8 to one U.S. dollar, a more favorable rate of exchange to foreign
investors than the prevailing rate of RMB 1.6 to one U.S. dollar. 2 1 Two inter-
related policies justified this innovation. The PRC intended first to stimulate
exports by making them less costly to foreign purchasers, and second to restrict
imports by making them more costly for domestic purchasers.2 2 Despite the
sound reasoning of this economic policy, this dual exchange rate system was
abandoned in 1985 when the strength of the dollar caused the cost of exports to
rise above the RMB 2.8 rate. 23
Following the failures of the dual exchange rate system, the PRC increased the
foreign exchange "retention" rates for those enterprises and local governments
that were then involved in export markets. 24 The PRC also eliminated the share
that had been previously seized by the industrial administrative bureaus, which
were being phased out. 25 As of the fall of 1988, in most provinces the system
allowed 25 percent of total foreign earnings to be retained at the local level, such
earnings to be split equally between the local government and the exporting
enterprise, with the remaining 75 percent to be remitted to the central govern-
ment.26
These rules led to more capital retention at the local level, thus creating the
need for Swap Centers27 like the center in the SEZ of Shenzhen, where buyer and
18. Id.
19. Id. at 11.
20. Id.
21. Kamm, Reforming Foreign Trade, in E. VOGEL, ONE STEP AHEAD IN CHINA 338, 336 (1989).
22. Id.
23. id. but see Yowell, supra note 3, at 11, who argues:
From 1981 to 1985. the state use of exchange rate differentials proved a more satisfactory lever for promoting exports.
During this period, enterprises were allowed to sell their foreign exchange to the BOC at an internal settlement rate
of RMB 2,8:U.S.$1. This gave enterprises more RMB per dollar than the official rate: the rate, based on the actual
cost of earning foreign exchange from exports, ranged from RMB 1.7:US.$1 in 1989 to RMB 2.3:U.S.$1 in 1984.
The internal settlement rate mechanism enabled the government to subsidize foreign trade and provide export
incentives without devaluing the currency.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. However, this figure varies widely: provinces populated by national minorities, e.g., Xinjiang,
retain 50%; the SEZs and Tibet retain 100%; Guangdong and Fujian provinces retain 30%; tourism-
related enterprises retain 30%; and electrical and machinery enterprises can retain 50% or more. Id.
27. The establishment of Swap Centers was made possible by the Provisions of the State Council
for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, promulgated on Oct. 11, 1986.
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seller would negotiate rates of currency exchange under the SAEC's supervi-
sion. 28 Only domestic enterprises could trade at these first centers, and most
trading involved foreign exchange credit accounts rather than cash. 29 However,
by 1986 foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) (wholly owned foreign enterprises,
equity joint ventures, and contractual joint ventures) were allowed to participate
in the Swap Center network, the transactions following dissimilar patterns in
different cities. 30 The SEZs permitted direct transactions between foreign and
domestic enterprises; 31 Shanghai established a separate center for foreign and
domestic enterprises; 32 and still other cities required official approval of each
transaction, but lacked a physical center where buyer and seller met.33 While
virtually every city has offered these services, most cities have gradually con-
verted to the Shenzhen model 34 of a physical center.35 Prior to the establishment
of a physical center in Beijing, for example, foreign enterprises identified a
foreign exchange trading opportunity and then registered the transaction with the
SAEC.36 However, since Beijing has established the BSC, negotiation between
buyer and seller is prohibited, the Swap Center having the role of exclusive
intermediary. 37 In the Spring of 1988 the government established the NSC in
Beijing for interregional transactions. The BSC and NSC are the primary models
illustrated below to describe the rules and regulations of Swap Centers generally.
Recent reforms of the Swap Center system aim at creating incentives for local
governments and exporting enterprises in key industries such as textiles, arts and






34. For a description of the Shenzhen Swap Center, see The Foreign Exchange Centre in
Shenzhen-a Visit, CHINA MARKEr No. 11, at 27 (1988). The Shenzhen Swap Center allows open
negotiation between the parties and abolished a ceiling on the exchange rate in 1987.
35. Yowell, supra note 3, at 11.
36. Id. For an exposition of 1988 changes in general foreign exchange control regulations in
Beijing, see Gelatt, Foreign Exchange Control: Beijing Issues New Measures for Foreign-Invested
Firms, 10 East Asian Exec. Rep. (Int'l Exec. Rep.) No. 10, at 8 (Oct. 15, 1988). In August 1988
Beijing issued the Interim Measures on Foreign Exchange Control of Enterprises with Foreign
Investment (the Measures). The Measures require the BAEC's "examination and consent" before
FIEs engage in foreign exchange adjustments or swaps. This requirement ran contrary to the spirit of
the Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China for the Encouragement of
Foreign Investment, promulgated by the State Council on Oct. 22, 1986 (the 1986 "22 Articles"),
which, as they have been interpreted by Chinese officials, allowed FIEs to swap RMB for foreign
currency at the foreign exchange adjustment centers established throughout China and to simply
report the transaction to the exchange control authorities after the fact. Id. art. 14; Gelatt, supra, at
12. Indeed, Beijing's own investment encouragement regulations, like the 1986 "22 Articles,"
required only the sub-bureau's "supervision," but not its approval, for foreign currency adjustments
by FIEs. Certain Provisions of the Beijing Municipal People's Government Concerning the Imple-
mentation of the Provisions of the State Council for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, Oct.
11, 1989, art. 9; Gelatt, supra, at 12.
37. See infra text section I.
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crafts, and electronics.38 In the fall of 1988 the Bank of China (BOC) predicted
that restrictions on the use of foreign exchange credits would be soon abol-
ished, 39 enabling an enterprise to use its credits as it pleased and to open foreign
exchange accounts directly with banks. However, no such policy has been pro-
mulgated, and further restrictions have been anticipated."0 In addition, while in
the late 1980s there was a movement towards abolishing the ceiling on allowable
exchange rates,4 ' this has not been fully implemented, as is reflected in the BSC
rules, for fear that the rates might become usurious. The first movements toward
a freely fluctuating system were made in the spring and summer of 1990 in
Fujian, Shanghai, and Xiamen, following a brief shutdown of the Swap Center
system during the early months of that year.42
C. WHERE ARE SWAP CENTERS LOCATED?
Swap Centers have been established in province capitals, 43 coastal zone cit-
ies, 44 and other cities with independent planning.45 The first center opened in
Shenzhen in 1985,46 and others were established in the SEZs in the same year.47
38. Yowell, supra note 3, at 11.
39. Id. at 12.
40. According to Lucille A. Barale and Timothy A. Steinert of Coudert Brothers, the PRC's
SAEC issued new regulations in the fall of 1989 entitled, Regulations on Several Questions Con-
cerning Conversion of Foreign Currencies. These regulations were aimed at curbing the use of
foreign exchange certificates (FECs) by both Chinese and foreigners. One of two forms of Chinese
currency, FECs, serves as evidence that the holder has obtained local currency by converting hard
currency. FEC holders may purchase foreign goods and services, while RMB (the other currency)
holders may purchase only domestic items. The new regulations limit the ability of foreigners who
hold FECs to reconvert them back into foreign currency. Now, foreign individuals may convert only
50% of their FEC holdings back into a foreign currency. In addition, the new regulations prevent
foreign representative offices, embassies, and nonprofit organizations from reconverting foreign
exchange into foreign currency. It should be noted that these restrictions apply only to cash trans-
actions. Barale & Steinert note that "[w]hile the new SAFEC Regulations may reduce the unautho-
rized outflow of hard currency, they will more certainly reduce the inflow of foreign currency."
Barale & Steinert, Exchanging Foreign Currency in China: New Rules Issued, I I East Asian Exec.
Rep. (Int'l Exec. Rep.) No. 12, at 9 (Dec. 15, 1989).
41. Yowell, supra note 3, at 12.
42. On May 7, 1989, China Daily cited widespread praise by high foreign exchange authorities
for the Shanghai Swap Center. Foreign Exchange Centre Praised, China Daily, May 7, 1989. China
Daily reported that the Shanghai Swap Center had 58 members, including 15 brokers and 43 dealers.
The brokers are the Chinese and foreign financial institutions authorized to deal in foreign currency
business. The dealers are major Chinese and foreign-invested enterprises and foreign trade compa-
nies, which are permitted to exchange foreign currency only in their own possession. Id.
43. In the fall of 1988, a total of 29 centers were planned for the provinces, autonomous regions,
and municipalities (including Hainan, but excluding Tibet). Yowell, supra note 3, at 10.
44. There are fourteen coastal cities.
45. These number ten.
46. Yowell, supra note 3, at 11.
47. China's Exchange Markets Growing Up Fast, Kyodo News Serv. (May 12, 1988)) [here-
inafter Kyodo, May 12, 1988].
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The NSC has been established in Beijing for interregional transactions.4 8 In
addition to the Swap Centers established in Shenzhen, 49 Shanghai (SSC), and
Beijing (BSC), others have been set up in Guangzhou, Xiamen, Xian, Tianjin,
and Hangzhou.50 In December 1989 China Daily reported that more than ninety
Swap Centers had been established, most of them located in the coastal areas.
5 1
D. JURISDICTION
In theory, there are three levels of jurisdiction: state, provincial, and local. The
NSC has jurisdiction over intra-central governmental trades and intergovernmen-
tal trades between the central government and the provinces, as well as interre-
gional trades involving foreign enterprises registered at the national level by the
Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT). The provincial
level of jurisdiction encompasses trades between cities and provinces, but be-
cause it is extremely rare for a province or a city to apply for a sale of foreign
exchange, the provincial Swap Centers are almost entirely inactive. All other
transactions appear to fall under the cities' local jurisdictions, as with the BSC.
E. How MUCH FOREIGN CURRENCY HAS BEEN TRADED?
The SAEC estimated that in 1987 alone $4.2 billion was traded at Swap
Centers throughout China. 52 FIEs accounted for $330 million worth of transac-
tions during 1987. 53 In 1988 Swap Centers transacted $6.2 billion of foreign
exchange trading,54 accounting for 34 percent of the foreign exchange retained
by enterprises.5 5 From January through August of 1989, $5.8 billion was ex-
changed through Swap Centers. 56 During this period, the FIEs traded $1.05
billion, nearly one-fifth of the total amount.57 As may be expected, the trading
48. The NSC was probably established in the summer of 1988. Word first came of plans to
establish such a center in May of that year. China Considering Relaxing Foreign Exchange Controls,
Kyodo News Serv. (May 3, 1988).
49. State Rules art. 10 provides: "The adjustment of foreign exchange in Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone shall continue to be conducted in accordance with the approved measures."
50. In December 1987 Zhejiang Province established a Swap Center in Hangzhou in order to
help FLEs balance their hard currency. During its first eight months of operation, $124.31 million was
traded at the Hangzhou Swap Center. Financial Market Taking Shape in Zhejiang, Xinhua Gen.
Overseas News Serv. (Xinhua News Agency) (Sept. 5, 1988).
51. U.S. Dollar Drops in China's Foreign Exchange Dealing Centers," Xinhua Gen. Overseas
News Serv. (Xinhua News Agency) (Dec. 3, 1989) (reporting on article inChina Daily) [hereinafter
China Daily, Dec. 3, 19891.
52. Asian News-China; Foreign Exchange Markets in China Booming, China News Serv. (Feb.
15, 1989) [hereinafter Asian News]; see also Kyodo, May 12, 1988, supra note 47.
53. Kyodo, May 12, 1988, supra note 47.
54. Asian News, supra note 52.
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volume has been heavier in the SEZs. The Shenzhen Center oversaw $100
million of swaps in 1987 and nearly $100 million per month in 1988; the Xiamen
Center transacted $71 million in 1987.8 In Shanghai, the trading of $28 million
was much lighter than in the SEZs in the same year.5 9 But between 1985 and
1990, the SSC handled trades in foreign exchange in excess of $3.6 billion. 60
II. Rules and Regulations of the Swap Center
A. WHAT KINDS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE MAY BE SOLD?
In order to sell foreign exchange for local currency, the foreign exchange must
be derived from a legal source, such as exports or loans. 61 In particular, two
types of foreign exchange 62 can be traded through the Swap Center: (1) the
excess foreign exchange export earnings retained by a Chinese domestic enter-
prise,63 and (2) foreign exchange owned by a foreign enterprise derived mostly
either from equity or sales income. 64
B. FOR WHAT PURPOSES MAY FOREIGN EXCHANGE BE BOUGHT?
1. By a Domestic Chinese Enterprise?
According to the State Rules, a domestic Chinese enterprise may buy foreign
exchange only for the following purposes:
(1) importation of advanced equipment and spare parts thereof as well as
advanced technology;
(2) purchase of equipment, instruments, reagents, scientific information,
and books and periodicals for scientific research, medical treatment, and
education, and the like; and
58. These figures were taken from Yowell, supra note 3, at 12, citing the Hong Kong Shanghai
Banking Corporation's statistics.
59. Id.
60. At the time of this writing, figures for 1990 and 1991 had not yet been made available.
61. The same is true of the regulations for the Shanghai as well as the Shenzhen and the Xiamen
Swap Centers in the SEZs (SEZs), according to the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation
information assembled in Yowell, supra note 3, at 12.
62. The Shanghai Rules, in art. 7, provide: "The foreign exchange for the purpose of these
Regulations includes: spot exchange of U.S. dollar, pound sterling, deutsche mark, Japanese yen and
Hong Kong dollar and the quantum [meaning the standard unit] of foreign exchange calculated in
U.S. dollar." These are the standard tradable currencies throughout the Swap Center system; how-
ever, Shenzhen puts no restriction whatsoever on the type of currency to be traded.
63. By "excess," this author believes the Chinese authorities mean the excess beyond either the
economic need for foreign exchange to purchase exports or the legal limitations on foreign exchange
retention, which appears to vary by both industry and region. See supra text section I.B.
64. Shanghai Rules art. 2 lists three categories of foreign exchange that can be sold in the
Shanghai Swap Center: (i) "various retained foreign exchange earnings"; (ii) "foreign exchange of
enterprises with foreign investment"; and (iii) "donations in foreign exchange."
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(3) purchase of raw materials, processed materials, auxiliary materials, spare
parts, and fine breeds of seeds and livestock.65
The State Rules, however, provide that purchase of the aforementioned items shall
not be resold by the domestic unit "at a profit," or "utilized for the purchase of
market materials or for the payment of expenses of trips abroad unrelated to the
aforementioned purposes." 66 State officials also indicated that foreign exchange
purchased by domestic Chinese enterprises may not legally be used to purchase
luxury items for import, such as TVs and other home appliances.
2. By a Foreign Invested Enterprise?
Purchase of foreign exchange by FIEs, which include cooperative and equity
joint ventures as well as wholly foreign-owned enterprises, must be made pur-
suant to the "satisfaction of foreign exchange requirements of enterprises with
foreign investment within their business scopes, repayment of principal and
interest of loans and remittance of profits." 67 The Swap Center authorities want
most of all to ensure that the foreign exchange purchased by a foreign enterprise
will be used for China-related business purposes. It may be unrealistic to expect
that the authorities will be able to enforce this in each and every swap. However,
their ability to control the use of foreign exchange will increase over time as the
Swap Center system becomes more centrally regulated. As foreign exchange
swappers become repeat players, and as the concept of eligibility through mem-
bership is developed, the imposition of sanctions (such as revocation of mem-




In order to obtain both a copy of the application form and the regulations for
the BSC, the foreign enterprise must first identify itself as interested in buying or
selling foreign exchange through the BSC;6 9 otherwise, the regulations are un-
65. State Rules art. 2, and Shanghai Rules art. 3. Unlike the Shanghai Rules, the State Rules
appear to be aimed at regulating the Chinese domestic enterprises and do not address the issue of
permissible purchases by foreign enterprises, discussed below.
66. State Rules art. 2.
67. This fourth purpose is provided only in the Shanghai Rules art. 3, and is absent from the
State Rules, because the State Rules appear to be directed at Chinese domestic enterprises rather than
foreign enterprises.
68. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) operates very effectively with this form of sanction.
When a debtor nation defaults on an IMF "loan," cast as a currency sale with a repurchase agree-
ment, the IMF does not claim an event of default or litigate, it simply withholds future credit, which
is far more devastating to those defaulting nations.
69. For an unofficial translation of the general Beijing foreign exchange regulations, see the
Interim Measures of Beijing Municipality on Administration of Foreign Exchange of Foreign Invest-
ment Enterprises, China Econ. News, Oct. 3, 1988, at 9-10.
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obtainable. The NSC reportedly has no regulations or application forms as such
(even though the author was able to obtain a copy of the State Rules). Since the
NSC was fashioned after the SSC, however, no significant differences between
the Shanghai Rules and the NSC rules are anticipated.7 °
D. REGISTRATION PREREQUISITES TO APPLYING FOR A SWAP
1. Foreign Economic Relations Approval
The first prerequisite to making application at the Swap Centers is approval of
the foreign enterprise's investment contracts by either MOFERT (for the NSC),
or the Beijing Municipal Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Commission
(for the BSC). Individuals may not swap foreign exchange at either the NSC or
the BSC, although they are able to do so in the SEZs.
7 1
2. Business License
The second prerequisite is the proof of issuance of a business license from
either the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (for the NSC) or the
Beijing Administration of Industry and Commerce (for the BSC).
E. REGISTRATION WITH THE BSC
Whereas one can apply directly for a swap at the NSC, the BSC requires the
foreign enterprise first to register with the Beijing Administration of Exchange
Control (BAEC). Not unlike the SSC, the BSC operates as a membership sys-
tem, 72 which gives the authorities greater control over participating enterprises.
If a swapper violates a regulation, the Swap Center may then revoke member-
ship. If revocation of membership means that an enterprise will henceforth be
ineligible to buy or sell foreign exchange, this penalty is a more effective sanc-
tion than the attachment of the money transacted at the time of the violation.
Registration requirements include submission of both (1) copies of approval
from the Beijing Municipal Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Commission
and (2) the business license issued by the Beijing Administration of Industry and
Commerce. Registration does not obligate the foreign enterprise to make an offer
or to authorize a trade. This procedure is simply designed both for the BAEC to
70. For a discussion of regulations issued in 1987 that impose administrative controls on the
opening of bank accounts by foreign investment enterprises in Shanghai and the business activity
involving such accounts, see Gelatt & Chan, Rules Restricting Shanghai FIEs Come to Light, East
Asian Exec. Rep., (Int'l Exec. Rep.), at 9 (Aug. 15, 1988).
7 1. In May 1988 guidelines were established to allow individuals in China's Shenzhen Economic
Zone, where the black market for hard currency was thriving, to purchase foreign currency with their
local Chinese currency. Shenzhen Allows Individual Currency Deals, Kyodo News Serv. (May 27,
1988). Cf. Yowell, supra note 3, at 12, stating that individuals in Shenzhen and Xiamen can sell, but
not buy, foreign exchange, and enterprises outside the SEZs must get SAEC approval.
72. See Shanghai Rules art. 8.
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determine whether the foreign enterprise properly falls within its jurisdiction and




The application requirements at the NSC and the BSC do not differ signifi-
cantly. Because the BSC requires preregistration with the BAEC, the venture
contracts or business license need not be resubmitted, because the BAEC will
already have that information on file.
To make application for a swap, one must provide the following information:
(1) the name of the foreign enterprise;
(2) a description of the form of foreign enterprise, such as equity joint
venture, cooperative joint venture, or foreign wholly owned subsidiary;
(3) a copy of the foreign enterprise's business license (for the NSC only);
(4) the estimated amount of currency the applicant wishes to swap;
(5) the purpose of the swap, regarding the scope of the enterprise's business
purpose; and
(6) any contracts documenting the validity of the enterprise's proposed pur-
pose for use of foreign currency (documentation of purpose for the pur-
chase of local currency is not required).
G. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL
The standards for approval are roughly the same in the NSC and the BAEC.
(The BAEC, as stated above, is the approval authority for the BSC.) The NSC
is generally guided by the requirements discussed in section II.B above. The
NSC's overriding concern is that any purchase of foreign exchange be made
pursuant to normal business activities within the scope of the enterprise's busi-
ness license. The BAEC shares this concern.
Mr. Liu, vice chief of the BAEC, suggested that the BAEC standards for
approval of a domestic Chinese enterprise's purchase of foreign currency were
more stringent than those for approval of purchase by a foreign enterprise.
Although he was not at liberty to discuss how the standards differed in great
detail, Mr. Liu has offered a few guidelines. First, if the contract between a
foreign enterprise and its Chinese partner contains an exchange clause, the
BAEC will ensure that no party exceeds the foreign exchange percentages lim-
ited by the contract. If in the alternative the contract contains no specific provi-
73. State Rules art. 5 provides:
A Unit wishing to participate in the adjustment of reserved foreign exchange allowances shall submit a written
application to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control or a branch thereof, and handle the registration
procedures upon examination and approval by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control or its
branch ....
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sion, the BAEC will review the application on a case-by-case basis, based on its
estimation of the foreign exchange needed by the applicant considering the
nature of its business. Second, the BAEC does not monitor the purpose of local
currency purchases. Third, the BAEC does not require documentation of the
source of foreign exchange being sold. Finally, however, prior to granting ap-
proval, the BAEC requires evidence, such as contracts, to document the purpose
served by an enterprise's purchase of foreign exchange.
H. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN OFFER?
Whereas applying for a swap in the NSC and SSC does not necessarily bind
the applicant to a particular amount of currency, in the BSC, application itself
constitutes a unilateral offer, binding on the seller, whereby the seller may not
change the amount of the transaction. Whereas in the NSC there is some form of
negotiation through the NSC as the exclusive intermediary, in the BSC, the
application constitutes an offer at the ceiling rate, and the BSC then attempts to
find a buyer at that rate. If an identified buyer offers a lower rate, that constitutes
a counteroffer, which the seller is free to reject.7 4 The BSC rate is public infor-
mation to which potential buyers and sellers at all times have access. 75 Because
the exchange of foreign exchange was a sellers' market at the time the BSC was
established, the purpose of the BSC ceiling was to keep the rate of exchange at
a reasonable level.76
I. NEGOTIATION
While the trading process in the NSC was described more as an open market
in which buyers and sellers chose their transactions according to a master board
of offers, the BSC will only notify the seller of a price lower than the ceiling rate
if the buyer proposes such a lower rate. The seller has the right to reject such an
offer. At both the NSC and BSC any direct purchase, sale, or negotiation be-
tween seller and buyer is strictly prohibited.7 7 Both the NSC and BSC appear to
74. Mr. Wei said that the current rate of exchange in summer of 1989 in the NSC was approx-
imately RMB 6.7 for every U.S. $1. Mr. Liu indicated that the ceiling rate set in the summer of 1989
by the BSC was RMB 6.65 for every U.S. $1.
75. The current SSC rate is also published; however, the SSC does not cap the rate at a ceiling
in the same manner.
76. State Rules art. 8 suggests a lower rate for cash transactions:
With respect o the adjustment of foreign exchange in cash, the currently highest rate for such transactions is I U.S.
dollar to RMB 4.2. Transactions of foreign exchange in cash must be conducted through Bank of China or financial
institutions approved by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control.
Shanghai Rules art. 16 leads one to believe that no ceiling is imposed on the exchange rate in the
SSC. If this is true, then the SSC differs from that in BSC. Article 16 states: "the transaction prices
shall be determined pursuant to the supply and demand conditions of the foreign exchange and
according to the principle of selling and buying foreign exchange through price bidding."
77. State Rules art. 4 provides that "the adjustment of retained foreign exchange must be
conducted through the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control or branches thereof, or
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operate as informal, yet centrally monitored, markets where the Swap Center
itself is the exclusive trader78 and where buyer and seller never speak to or meet
one another.
In contrast, at the SSC the enterprise registered with the local administration
of foreign exchange control hires a broker to do business in the center.79 An
electronic screen flashes the opening price of the U.S. dollar against the RMB.80
The brokers then enter their desired prices and buy or sell orders based on the
initial price. 8 1 Only then do the brokers begin to exchange bids. 82 If both sides
stop bidding, the deal is finalized after a fifteen-second countdown on the timer,
before another round of bidding follows. 83
J. BINDING THE PARTIES
In the NSC the parties are bound once they are notified of approval of the
negotiated transaction. 84 In the BSC, once a buyer is found at the price offered
by the seller, the parties are bound. The BSC then notifies both the seller and
buyer of the transaction. The BSC makes four copies of the terms of the
transaction: one for each party, one for the BOC, and one for itself. The parties
to the transaction have five days within which to ask the BOC to execute the
transaction. Strangely, however, the BOC is under no obligation to make the
payment within any specified time period.85 In the estimation of Mr. Liu, if
both parties have open accounts at the BOC, the transaction should be made in
one or two days. Nevertheless, the transaction may be delayed. This potential
delay constitutes an element of risk that must be taken into account in the
applicant's business decision to purchase foreign exchange through the BSC
and elsewhere.
K. SIx-MONTH TIME LIMIT
The purchaser of foreign exchange then has six months within which to use the
foreign exchange for the specified purpose or face the prospect of a forced
through financial institutions approved by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control.
Selling or buying foreign exchange without authorization is strictly prohibited."
78. Shanghai Rules art. 9 permits "brokers," i.e. local banks and other nonbank financial
organizations, "that have been issued a Foreign Exchange Business License by the SAEC to conduct
transactions on behalf" of individual business entities.





84. State Rules art. 5 provides: "Upon receipt of a notice of the conclusion of an adjustment
transaction, the Unit shall, with such notice, go through the procedures for the settlement and transfer
of foreign exchange with the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control or a branch thereof."
85. This may simply be a way of providing an incentive to encourage participants to open up
such an account with the BOC.
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resale. 86 Yet it remains unclear when exactly the six-month time limit com-
mences: with the date of notification to the parties, the date of notification by the
parties to the bank, or the date the bank conducts the transaction. Because there
may be delays before the currency actually changes hands, the most reasonable
presumption would be that the six-month clock starts ticking with the actual
transfer of funds.
1. Six-Month Extension
At the BSC, if the purchaser is unable to spend the money within that time, it
may apply for an extension, not to exceed an additional six months.8 7
2. Altering the Purpose
If the purchaser wishes to alter the purpose for which the foreign exchange is
to be used, it must submit an application to the BAEC. It is not clear what must
be done in the NSC in order to alter the specified purpose.
3. Increasing the Amount
In the NSC the parties may alter the amount at any time before both parties
agree to a rate. 88 In the BSC, however, the parties may not reduce the amount
specified in the application, and if the seller wishes to increase the amount, it
must make out another application for the difference.
4. Forced Resale
If the purchaser of foreign exchange does not meet the time limitation in which
to spend the foreign exchange, the BSC will impose a forced resale. In such an
instance, the purchaser will be forced to sell the foreign exchange back to the
BSC at the lower of either the rate at the time of purchase or the prevailing
market rate at the end of the time limit. It is not quite clear what the NSC
penalties are for exceeding the time limit, but based on a reasonable reading of
the rule pertaining to such a case, the NSC may well have the same procedure.89
86. State Rules art. 7 provides that the "retained foreign exchange purchased through such
adjustment shall be utilized within six (6) months."
87. State Rules art. 7 provides: "Should the foreign exchange so purchased not be used within
the stipulated period, an extension of six (6) months may be granted upon approval by the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange Control or a branch thereof."
88. According to Mr. Wei, at the national level the only special treatment, that is, priority for a
particular swap, is given to swaps between two joint ventures of one common parent, but the two
joint ventures are still obligated to use the Swap Center. This appears to contradict certain provisions
of the regulations relating to joint ventures and may be an example of an administrator broadening
his bureaucratic jurisdiction.
89. State Rules art. 7 provides: "The unused foreign exchange or any portion thereof shall be
otherwise adjusted by the State Administrations of Foreign Exchange Control or branches thereof."
The Shanghai Rules art. 46 state the same rule understood to exist in the BSC:
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L. THE CENTER'S COMMISSIONS9 0
The BSC charges commissions in RMB of 0.15 percent of the difference
between the total of RMB traded at the Swap Center rate and the hypothetical
total of RMB that the seller of foreign exchange would have obtained in a trade
based on the official legal rate. 9' Both the seller and buyer pay this commission
on the transaction. In contrast, the NSC takes a commission of 0.15 percent of
the transacted amount in RMB.92 Such commission shall never be lower than
RMB 10, nor higher than RMB 10,000.
93
M. PERMISSIBLE FREQUENCY OF SWAPS
An applicant is generally not limited in the number of times it may use either
the NSC or the BSC. At the NSC, as soon as the enterprise can demonstrate it has
used the entire sum of foreign exchange purchased for the originally specified
purpose, it may use the Swap Center again. For example, if a foreign enterprise
demonstrates that it used the foreign currency obtained in a swap immediately to
pay off a loan related to its domestic Chinese business, it may then return to the
Swap Center to do more business.
At the BSC the same is generally true, although Mr. Liu indicated that a
foreign enterprise will not necessarily have to prove that the foreign exchange
was used for the purpose stated in the application. Nevertheless, Mr. Liu con-
sidered it advisable for the foreign enterprise to avoid utilizing the foreign ex-
change for another purpose. Mr. Liu said there was no specific rule or limitation
regarding the frequency with which a foreign enterprise may apply for a swap,
but that the normal time span between transactions was six months. Mr. Liu
The foreign exchange acquired in the Swap Center shall be used within a period of six (6) months. If such foreign
exchange is not used within such period for any proper reason, such period may be extended once for six (6) months,
subject to the approval by SAEC, Shanghai Branch. If the foreign exchange has not been used or has not been used
completely, such foreign exchange, or remainder, shall be purchased by the People's Bank of China. Shanghai
Branch. The price for such purchase shall be the price at which such foreign exchange was originally bought in the
case that original purchase price is lower than the price prevailing in the Swap Center on the day of such purchase
by the Bank, or shall be the price prevailing in the Swap Center on the day of such purchase by the Bank in the case
that the original purchase price is higher than the price prevailing in the Swap Center on the day of such purchase by
the Bank.
90. Cf., State Rules art. 5, which provides that "the foreign exchange administration authorities
shall exempt such sellers and buyers from service fees."
91. Due to two further devaluations of RMB, the rate in the fall of 1990 was RMB 4.7 to every
U.S. $1, China Daily, Oct. 27, 1990, and then RMB 5.2 to every U.S. $1, Business Asia, Dec. 3,
1990, at 419.
92. See, State Rules art. 8, which provides:
In accordance with the rate used and the amount of the transaction, a 1% to 3% service fee may be charged to the
buyer and seller for handling the procedures of settlement of an adjustment transaction of retained foreign exchange
in cash. The minimum service fee for each transaction shall be RMB 10 and the maximum, RMB 10,000.
93. Both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Swap Centers impose the same commission as does the
NSC. The Xiamen Center, however, has no minimum or maximum commission, and charges the
buyer 0.1% and the seller 0.2% of the total transaction in RMB. Yowell, supra note 3, at 10.
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stressed that the BSC was intent on preventing speculative or simultaneous
trading. Yet, the question still remains whether any time restrictions will be
placed on a recent seller of foreign exchange who may immediately wish to
purchase foreign exchange.
N. LIMITATIONS ON QUOTA AND CASH AccouNTs
The only restriction of the maximum utilization of the Swap Center pertains to
upper limits placed on either quota or cash accounts opened with the BOC, but
such limitations are not yet clear.
94
I. Quota Accounts95
Quota accounts are set up to establish export incentives for domestic Chinese
enterprises. Under current law, initial foreign exchange profits made from ex-
ports must be sold immediately to the BOC in exchange for local currency.
However, in order to create an incentive for export (or rather, in order to coun-
teract the disincentive of a compulsory sale), the domestic enterprise is given a
quota account for 20 percent to 30 percent of its foreign currency profits. 96 The
domestic enterprise is then permitted to purchase foreign currency to the limits
of its BOC quota account in order to meet its subsequent foreign currency
expenditures for items such as imported materials, technology, and equipment.
In this way the BOC maintains control of the foreign currency and monitors the
purposes for which it may be spent domestically by Chinese domestic enter-
prises.
2. Cash Accounts
Mr. Wei did not outline the scope of restrictions on cash accounts for foreign
enterprises. He stated that no upper limit would be placed on a foreign enterprise
wishing to sell local currency in return for foreign exchange, as long as the
foreign enterprise complies with all of the pertinent regulations. Although Mr.
Wei implied that restrictions on cash accounts did apply to domestic enterprises,
the details of such restrictions remain unclear.
94. The author was not been able to verify the information provided by Mr. Wei on cash and
quota accounts specified below.
95. State Rules art. 6 provides:
In using the reserved foreign exchange allowances obtained through such adjustment, the buyer must have an
approved quota of foreign exchange expenditure. Upon presentation (by the buyer) of a foreign exchange allocation
fonm in which the already taken portion in the quota for foreign exchange expenditure has been marked off by the local
branch of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control. banks shall handle the procedures for settlement and
payment.
96. These were the figures given for Beijing only. As noted above, this percentage differs
substantially according to industry and location.
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0. MORE CONTROL OVER DOMESTIC THAN FOREIGN ENTERPRISES
From the author's limited experience in participating in the Swap Center
system, foreign investment enterprises at the BSC do not appear to be heavily
controlled, while domestic entities are carefully scrutinized. Although the system
described by officials for the NSC and BSC appears to set a number of detailed
controls on the use of the centers, one cooperative joint venture in Beijing, which
was managed by the Chinese partner, is informally reported to have used the
BSC indiscriminately for the importation of automobiles, TVs, and other con-
sumer goods to be distributed to the personnel of the Chinese partner. In that case
the Chinese partner (which was itself engaged in an import/export business)
found it much easier to use the cooperative's business license to purchase foreign
exchange with local currency than to do so directly itself. This instance illustrates
one way that the regulation of the Swap Centers may be circumvented by ex-
ploiting the different levels of scrutiny directed at foreign and domestic enter-
prises.
III. Relevance of the Swap Center Model Outside of the PRC
Regardless of the unclear future of the Swap Center system in China, the
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, 97 and other socialist, centrally planned economies
should consider applications of the Swap Center model.9 8 The Soviet Union has
taken three steps toward convertibility of the ruble in the last few years and has
expressed its intention to establish foreign exchange adjustment centers similar to
those in the PRC. 99 Economists say that full convertibility, which would make
97. According to Zbigniew M. Slupinski of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, the Polish Foreign
Exchange Law (PFEL), effective Jan. 1, 1990, introduced partial convertibility of the Polish zloty.
All foreign trade transactions are subject to the PFEL, which applies a sharply devalued exchange
rate of 9,500 zloty to the U.S. dollar. The Central Bank of Poland guarantees the availability of
sufficient amounts of hard currency to realize consumers' demands of consumers and of companies
incorporated in Poland. Dziennik Ustaw, 1989, No. 6, item 33 (translation available in Central East
European Legal Materials, I SoviEr AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW No. 3, at 7 (Parker School Bulletin,
Columbia Univ. 1989)); see also Slupinski, Foreign Investment in the Banking Sector and Emergence
of the Financial Market in Poland, 25 INT'L LAW. 127 145-46 (1991). As early as in the summer of
1990, Romania announced plans to launch foreign exchange auctions as well. Romanian Firms to
Buy Hard Currency at Auction, Reuter Lib. Rep. (Reuters) (Aug. 14, 1990).
98. For example, in 1989 Poland issued 180 foreign currency trading licenses to public sector
companies, and the expansion of the foreign currency auction system which was to be introduced in
the Summer of 1989. Decisive Year for Western Investment in Eastern Europe, Fin. Times, Feb. 23,
1989. Bulgaria also holds auctions at which firms can bid for hard currency. Ruble Trouble, Stepping
Out, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 14, 1989).
99. Rumors of Soviet plans to widen the scope of foreign currency auctions to include non-
Soviet enterprises such as joint ventures and to allow Soviet citizens to open hard currency bank
accounts without inquiry into the source of ownership were reported in an article by Peel, Moscow
Sets Bait for Dollars, European News, July 26, 1990, § I, at 2. In June 1990 Business Week reported
that "more internal currency auctions will be held to give joint ventures, cooperatives, and others
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the ruble freely exchangeable with currencies of Western industrialized coun-
tries, is necessary if the Soviet economy is to be fully integrated into world
markets. 'oo At least partial convertibility of the ruble is a significant precondition
for several foreign investors in the Soviet economy. 10 At the official exchange
rate prior to October 1989, the ruble was worth just under $1.60, but at that time
the ruble was grossly overvalued. 102 Western tourists in Moscow say they are
regularly offered up to ten rubles to the dollar on the black market, 10 3 and some
banks in the West sell the Soviet currency for as much as five time less than the
official rate. 104 Transnational bartering, or countertrade, between the Soviet
Union and foreign multinational enterprises also reflects a partial devaluation of
the ruble. For example, the $3 billion barter of Soviet vodka and freighters for
Pepsi Cola in the spring of 1990, wherein the Soviet goods would have been
worth $9 billion at the official Soviet rate of exchange, assumed a significant, yet
partial, devaluation of the ruble. 105
In its first step in the spring of 1988, the Soviet banking system developed the
first mechanism for Soviet exporters to hedge their foreign exchange expo-
sure. 10 6 In the first unified link between the ruble and Western currencies,
Vneshekonombank, the Soviet Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs, has been
offering a service that allows Soviet enterprises to tie the exchange rate of the
ruble to a basket of foreign currencies for periods of up to twelve months. 107 This
was the first unified link between the ruble and Western currencies. One Amer-
ican banker in London commented that this step was "significant because it links
expanded access to hard currency." Brady, Galuszka, Boyle & Borrus, The Market Is Coming!, Bus.
WK., June 4, 1990, at 60.
100. Soviet Union Holds First Foreign Currency Auction, Reuters Bus. Rep. (Reuters) (Nov. 3,
1980) [hereinafter Reuters, Nov. 3, 1989]. Following similar moves by the Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), in late summer of 1989, the U.S. Commerce Department
lifted restrictions on exports to the USSR of 286-based, IBM PC/AT-compatible personal computers
running at less than 16MHz. However, according to several industry executives, "currency con-
vertibility is the heaviest chain dragging down a market that could exceed 30 million desktop
systems." Bunker, Moscow Holds PC Trade Growth Key, 35 Electronic News, Sept. 18, 1989, at 24.
Of all the barriers that remain, "currency convertibility is at the heart of the matter ...... stated
Everett Ehrlich, a Vice President for economic analysis at Unisys Corp. Id.
101. For example, the Gillette Company has tentatively agreed to build a razor blade factory in the
Soviet Union, but is demanding hard currency payment. Ramirez, Pepsi will be Bartered for Ships
and Vodka in Deal with Soviets, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1990, § A, at I [hereinafter N.Y. Times]. It is
a commonly held view that the greatest obstacles for implementing joint ventures in the Soviet Union
are the inconvertibility of the ruble and the related difficulty in repatriating profits. Kaslow, United
States-Eastern European Trade, Joint Ventures, Christian Sc. Monitor, Dec. 4, 1989, at 8.
102. Reuters, Nov. 3, 1989, supra note 100.
103. Soviets Plan First Auction of Currencies, Los Angeles Times, May 12, 1989, Business
Section, part 4, at 4, col. 6 (Friday home ed.) [hereinafter L.A. Times].
104. Condradi, Economist Urges Freeing Soviet Enterprises to Trade Currency, Reuters Lib. Rep.
(Reuters) (Sept. 9, 1988).
105. N.Y. Times, supra note 101.
106. Duffy, Soviet Test Linking the Ruble to Foreign Currencies 1988 AMERICAN BANKER, Inter-
national Banking, at 2 (Aug. 12, 1988). The following section relies exclusively on the Duffy piece.
107. Id.
VOL. 25, NO. 2
SWAP CENTERS IN THE PRC 435
economic activity inside the Soviet Union to economic activity in the West," and
that this was "the nucleus for a true foreign exchange market and could well lead
to complete convertibility for the ruble." 10 8 Officials at the Vneshekonombank
characterized the new forward market in rubles as a practical effort to improve
the efficiency of state enterprises. 109
In a forward currency market, a bank quotes projected buy and sell prices for
foreign currencies at designated future dates. The purpose of such a market is to
allow companies to protect themselves against adverse currency movements. 10
The deputy manager of the Vneshekonombank branch in Zurich, Nikolai Tovs-
tenchouk, stated that this mechanism "allows state enterprises to effect better
planning. They can show in advance that $2 million in export revenues will
amount to so much in rubles."'' The bank's new foreign exchange hedging
system is based on theoretical "ruble baskets," which have been designed along
the lines of the European Currency Unit (ECU). " 2 The ruble basket represents
weighted averages of the U.S. dollar, the deutsche mark, the Swiss franc, the
French franc, the Japanese yen, and the British pound. 13 By assessing the
relative movements of each currency, the Vneshekonombank constructs weekly
ruble forward rates, which serve as the basis of forward rate agreements offered
to Soviet enterprises. 114 Western analysts said in the past that such rate agree-
ments were largely unnecessary because only a few Soviet state enterprises were
licensed to do business with the West, and the Soviet Government absorbed all
the foreign exchange risk. 115 With the reform of the Soviet economy under the
general policy of perestroika, however, the number of enterprises with foreign
trade rights has proliferated. 116 Jan Vanous, research director at PlanEcon Inc.,
a Washington-based firm that specializes in the economies of the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, stated that this experiment is "a reflection that some de-
centralization has taken place and that the state is no longer willing to shoulder
the entire foreign exchange risk.
'
""17
At the time of this experiment however, Soviet officials and Western econo-
mists agreed that complete convertibility, which would still be years away, raises
"far more complex problems" and may pose "huge social costs., ' 118 Econo-
mists say that full convertibility would cause prices of the basic necessities, such











118. As did state Mr. Tovstenchouk. Id.
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to Western levels, causing severe economic problems for most Soviets, espe-
cially those on fixed pensions. 119 Yet, it is also widely believed that in order to
be competitive on world markets, the Soviet financial system must be brought
into closer alignment with those of its Western trading partners. 120 This situation
suggests that convertibility should be more strictly limited to transnational com-
mercial transactions. The Swap Center model may provide an alternative means
to this end.
As early as September 1988 it became "clear that restructuring [the USSR's]
foreign economic links will be inhibited until [the USSR] can solve the currency
problem." 1 2' At that time, A. Sarkisyants, an economist at the Institute of
Foreign Economic Affairs, argued in the publication Sotsialisticheskaya Indus-
triya that the Soviet Union should ease its strict controls on foreign exchange
transactions to let its enterprises trade hard currencies among themselves.' 22
Such a market would address a vital domestic need for hard currency, and thus
"allow all enterprises . . . to import needed technology," leading to "an in-
crease of goods both for export and for the domestic market." '1 23 Although
Soviet reforms make it possible for more than one hundred enterprises to trade
directly with foreigners, many enterprises do not have the foreign currency to
import new technology, according to Mr. Sarkisyants. 124
In its second move on October 25, 1989, the Vneshekonombank took a ten-
tative step toward making the ruble acceptable in the West when it devalued the
ruble tenfold for Soviet citizens going abroad and for foreign tourists visiting the
USSR. ' 25 That regulation was introduced to put an economic crimp on Soviets
traveling abroad while legal restrictions loosen, as well as to encourage foreign-
ers to change money at state banks and starve the growing black market in
foreign currency. 126 A second purpose of devaluation cited by sovietologists was
to soak up some of the existing huge "overhang" of rubles saved by citizens,
estimated to be nearly 300 billion rubles. 127 With very little in the stores to
purchase, it remains to be seen exactly how much of this "overhang" will
actually be absorbed. Furthermore, this is not expected to have much effect on
foreign tourists. Although black marketeers were reported to be dismayed by the
news of the state banks offering a better rate than they had, shortages of almost
all consumer goods from soap powder to tea and furniture mean that rubles in
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. This quotation was taken from A. Sarkisyants, an economist at the Institute of Economic




125. Reuters, Nov. 3, 1989, supra note 100.
126. Id.
127. Rowen, supra note 2.
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themselves still have little purchasing power. 28 Moreover, most foreign tourists
are on prepaid, all-inclusive trips. They lodge in hard currency hotels and shop
in beriozki, special hard currency stores for foreigners.129 Most tourists, there-
fore, have little need for local currency. 130
In its third step 13 1 the USSR held its first auction of foreign exchange on
November 3, 1989, as a further attempt to make the ruble convertible into hard
currencies. 132 About 210 Soviet enterprises and organizations participated in the
auction at the Vneshekonombank 133 for roughly $13.5 million in hard currency
put up reportedly by just thirty-one other cash-rich state enterprises. 134 Potential
buyers sent their requests to the bank before the auction, listing the amounts of
currency they needed, as well as the prices at which they wanted to buy the
currency. 135 While the expected rate of exchange was seven rubles to the dol-
lar, 136 the actual rate of exchange per trade was higher, averaging 9.54 rubles to
the dollar and ranging from 6.28 to 16.95 rubles to the dollar. 137 It was unclear
whether the sellers of hard currency in the auction were genuine state enterprises,
or merely the state selling its hard currency reserves in order to ensure the
existence of a market. 138 Although the potential buyers were not identified, it
was reported that they could use the foreign currency purchased to import equip-
ment and goods, to make payments under contracts already concluded, or to pay
for services rendered by foreign firms.'
39
128. Moscow Wakes up to New Ruble and Is Unimpressed, Reuters Bus. Rep. (Reuters) (Nov. I,
1989). However, understand that this merely boosted the black market rates since the perceived need
for foreign currency, given its superior purchasing power, may be even greater now with a run on the
stores for most consumer goods.
129. As of Aug. 1, 1990, Soviet citizens are also allowed to purchase any goods with foreign
currency, to which few Soviets have access. See Orlov, The Soviet Government's Currency Resolu-
tion: Epitaph for Ruble?, Tass, July 31, 1990.
130. This is not necessarily true of long-term, repeat visitors, such as students, business people,
and Russian speakers with close ties to Soviet citizens. Those groups stand to gain from devaluation,
since they are likely to have a greater use for local rubles.
131. It is not clear whether the Soviets implemented their plan to allow Soviet enterprises to retain
a much greater share of their hard-currency export earnings, as was expected on Jan. 1, 1990. Other
plans include the adoption of at least a dual-currency scheme, predicted by Jan Vanous, president of
the Washington think-tank, PlanEcon, Inc. Brady & Galuszka, Soviet T-Bonds? They're Only the
Beginning, Bus. WK., Nov. 13, 1989, at 46.
132. For a report on the announcement made by Tass, the official Soviet news agency, see
Reuters, Nov. 3, 1989, supra note 100. For a report made while the results of the auction were being
tallied, see Brady & Galuszka, supra note 131.
133. Expected figures were reported in Reuters, Nov. 3, 1989, supra note 120. Actual figures
were summarized in Peel, Auction Underlines Ruble's Weakness, Fin. Times, Nov. 13, 1989 § I, at
4 [hereinafter Fin. Times].
134. Fin. Times, supra note 133. Similar figures were supplied in Ruble Shrinks Again, Wall St.
J., Nov. 13, 1989, at A4.
135. Reuters, Nov. 3, 1989, supra note 100.
136. Brady & Galuszka, supra note 131.
137. Fin. Times, supra note 133.
138. This question was raised in lzvestiya on Nov. 12, 1989. See Fin. Times, supra note 133.
139. Reuters, Nov. 3, 1989, supra note 100.
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Tass reported that the purpose of the auction was to help the USSR broaden
their export resources, introduce modern technology, raise the quality of their
output, and boost the production of consumer goods. 140 Tass also announced that
auctions would henceforth be held regularly as part of a package of measures
intended to open up the Soviet economy. 141 Tass added: "Auctions will become
yet another step in preparing conditions for a gradual transition to ruble con-
vertibility." 142 According to Juri Moskovsky, the chairperson of the Vneshek-
onombank, at first only Soviet enterprises and organizations will be allowed to
participate in the auctions. Then joint ventures and finally foreign firms will be
allowed to participate. 14 3 A second auction took place in January 1990 at which
the average auction price for U.S. $1 was 10.56 rubles. This second auction
involved slightly fewer participants, and less money was exchanged. 144
Finally, building on the innovation of auctions, the Soviet Government, on
August 4, 1990, decided to establish currency markets similar to the PRC Swap
Centers. 145 While auctions are superior to both black market transactions and
immediate, full-fledged convertibility, foreign exchange centers offer certain
advantages over auctions. In Swap Centers, currency trades can be more effec-
tively regulated according to general foreign trade policies, and certain industries
in particular need of foreign currency may be given trading right priorities in an
established center. The relative disadvantages of auctions (only state enterprises
meeting the minimum participation conditions were allowed to participate) and
the advantages of foreign exchange centers (the gradual grant of accessibility to
cooperatives and joint ventures) have been noted by the Soviet press. 146
As of January 1, 1991, all enterprises and organizations that are legal enti-
ties 14 7 under Soviet legislation have the right to buy and sell foreign currency
through interbank operations, currency exchange centers, auctions and other
means permitted by law. 148 Tass reported Soviet plans to establish national,
republican, and regional exchange centers. It also reported that interbank cur-




143. L.A. Times, supra note 103.
144. Peel, Foreign Exchange Auction Hits Value of the Rouble, Fin. Times, Jan. 23, 1990, at 2.
145. Government Decides to Establish Currency Market, Tass, Aug. 7, 1990 [hereinafter Tass,
Aug. 7, 1990].
146. Berger, How Much Is Hard Currency These Days?, Izvestiya, Aug. 11, 1990, at 2 (morning
ed.). Berger argues that "in order to prevent the foreign exchange market from sharing the fate of
the auctions we need to set up a centralized state foreign exchange fund adequate for the normal
conduct of day-to-day trading." Id. China Daily reported in February 1989 that a price stabilizing
fund would be created to purchase RMB in the case of an excessive price decline. Hong, Foreign
Exchange Markets Hope to Ease Wild Fluctuations, China Daily, Feb. 22, 1989.
147. Although ordinary citizens are still barred from engaging in currency swaps, virtually any-
one can set up a small enterprise and register it as a legal person. Berger, supra note 146.
148. Tass, Aug. 7, 1990, supra note 145.
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work in conjunction with Vneshekonombank, the finance ministry, and other
regional banks to take measures to support the ruble's rate against foreign
currencies. 149 According to government sources, before the end of 1990, coop-
eratives and joint ventures were gradually allowed to buy and sell foreign ex-
change. 150 While no mention of Chinese models is made, Tass openly states that
[d]ecision makers in the USSR increasingly draw in their work on the experience of
those East European countries, which, when faced with similar difficulties, resorted to
economic experimentation. In quest of the convertibility of their national monetary
units, [Poland and Yugoslavia] firmly abandoned individual enterprises' special cur-
rency accounts in banks in favor of free currency operations and monetary ex-
changes. "5'
In addition to the establishment of foreign exchange centers, in November
1990 the USSR introduced a new commercial rate of exchange of 1.66 rubles to
the dollar, raised from the prevailing official rate of 0.55 rubles to the dollar.' 
52
These development make it likely that the Soviets may draw on the PRC Swap
Center model of fully administrated and regulated markets for the regular sale
and purchase of foreign exchange.
IV. Conclusion: Perspectives on the
Future of the Swap Center Model
In their efforts to make local currency convertible, the PRC, like the USSR
and other nations,1 53 must proceed with caution. Devaluation may be one way
to starve the black market and make the PRC a world economic power, but de-
valuation may result in huge social costs. 154 For example, in December 1989
149. Id.
150. New Resolution on Monetary Exchange Discussed, Tass, Aug. 9, 1990.
151. id.
152. Peel, Debt Needs Prompt Hefty New Soviet Tax, Fin. Times, Nov. 6, 1990, at 2. A November
1990 decree requires Soviet enterprises to sell 40% of retained foreign exchange to an all-Union
currency fund. Id. For a critical and theoretical economic view of dual exchange rate systems, see
Lai, Exchange Rate Determination under Flexible and Two-Tier Exchange Rate Regimes, EASTERN
ECON. J. 115, 122 (1990).
153. When new ideas are proposed they are often quickly rejected by the Supreme Soviet, which
is newly sensitized to public opinion. On Oct. 31, 1989, the legislature immediately spumed an
unpopular government plan to boost prices for beer, cigarettes, and caviar. This type of setback
typifies the problem of competing long- and short-term political necessities, i.e., convertibility of the
ruble versus consumer goods on the shelves. Brady & Galuzska, supra note 131.
154. Establishment of a free market of foreign currencies should be distinguished from creating
a market of goods freely sold for those currencies, the latter known as the "dollarization" of local
currency. As of Aug. 1, 1990, Soviet citizens are allowed to purchase any goods with foreign
currency, suggesting the threat of replacing the ruble with the dollar as the national currency. This
dual currency system has been rejected by the East Europeans, and has been criticized by some in the
Soviet press. One Soviet newspaper remarked in caustic fashion that the new development marked
a step to the convertibility not of the dollar, but of the ruble. Orlov, The Soviet Government's
Currency Resolution: Epitaph for Ruble?, Tass, July 31, 1990. For example, 0. Mozhayskov, chief
of the Hard Currency and Economic Administration of the USSR State Bank, has noted in an
Izvestiya interview that "hard currency put in internal circulation will undermine even further our
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Beijing rumors of an impending currency devaluation set off a run on the banks,
with depositors withdrawing their savings. 155 Panicked consumers bought up
everything in sight to convert depreciating money into goods. 156 One Hebei
man, unable to find a better investment, in desperation purchased half a ton of
salt. 157 A Beijing store sold its monthly consignment of forty washing machines
in two hours at a price roughly equal to a factory worker's annual pay.
158
Harbin's main department store sold 600,000 electrical appliances in a month,
200 times its usual turnover.' 59 Some stores fanned the buy-now flames by
warning of price increases without any justification for believing in their likeli-
hood.'6o
Devaluation has been made possible by austerity programs that had caused a
sharp fall in inflation, the feared consequence of increased devaluation in the
past. 16' Following the Tianamen Square massacre of June 1989, earnings from
tourism dropped sharply, and foreign loans almost completely dried up, jeopar-
dizing foreign debt repayments' 62 and exacerbating other domestic needs for
foreign currency. 163 Economists raised doubt that a drop in the legal rate of
exchange would improve the price of exports. In this view, many factors com-
bine to limit the effectiveness of such a move: the restricted use of official
exchange rates;' 64 changes in prices or subsidies;165 constraints from low-price
elasticity; 166 and quantity or quality constraints. 67 Across-the-board devaluation
ruble, which is weak to begin with, and will certainly do nothing to promote the reinforcement of
monetary circulation in our country. It will rather do the opposite." Tass, Aug. 3, 1990; Greater
Internal Use of Hard Currency Seen, Izvestiya, July 14, 1990, at 2 (morning ed.). India, in contrast
to the recent Soviet "dollarization" of the ruble, has resolutely excluded the dollar from internal
turnover. How Are We Going to Cope with a Foreign Currency Avalanche?, Moscow News, Aug.
3-9, 1990, at 10.
155. Doder, Beijing Warns Big Spenders to Cool it as Reform Slows, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,






161. Sun, China Pins Its Economic Hopes on a Currency Devaluation, Fin. Times, Mar. 1, 1990,
§ 1, at 4. Mr. Sun is the manager of China Services at the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, London, England.
162. The PRC has accumulated approximately $40 billion of foreign debt, half of which is owed
to Japanese banks, according to Exchange Rates Rise Harmful to China's Exports, Reuter Bus. Rep.
(Reuters) (Nov. 24, 1989).
163. Sun, supra note 161.
164. Devaluation only affects trades at the official rates and will not affect Swap Center and black
market trading, which together may account for more than 6% of the PRC's total trade. Id.
165. By this, Sun means the reduction of export subsidies, on the assumption that these will no
longer be needed, or a rise in domestic prices. Id.
166. Sun argues that devaluation will have little effect on the volume of essential import or on the
price of goods in low demand in the international market. Id.
167. Sun points out that approximately 50% of China's import-export trade is regulated by quotas
and licenses, and the arguably lower quality of Chinese goods will limit any potential surge in
demand. Id.
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may also fall short of effectively limiting imports, since two-thirds of imports
are considered essential, and the last third includes grain and sugar, as well as
luxury items, which are already restricted by foreign import quotas. 168 On the
other hand, most would agree that, on the demand side, devaluation will improve
export opportunities for simple manufactures and light industrial goods that can
be mass-produced at an acceptable level of quality. 169 On the supply side, de-
valuation may also counter the incentives of Chinese traders to target domestic
markets to take advantage of overvalued RMB yuan. 1
70
Partial devaluation of local currency through application of the Swap Center
model may achieve some of the goals of full devaluation while avoiding many of
the social costs. The establishment of the NSC's exclusive jurisdiction over
interregional swaps and the deeper reluctance or the part of the various regions
to let foreign exchange out of the their jurisdiction 171 will bring about further
restrictions on interregional trades. This may deter arbitrage and exchange rate
speculation, as well as tend to level regional differences. Whereas foreign-
invested companies were initially able to carry out swaps all over the country, 1
72
the NSC is now able to eliminate swaps for superfluous imports such as luxury
items. 173
The importance of full convertibility of local currency as a necessary condi-
tion for integration into the world economy should not be exaggerated. Many key
players on the world economic scene, such as South Korea and India, do not have
fully convertible currencies. Furthermore, complete convertibility is not a pre-
requisite for membership in the International Monetary Fund, where less than
one half of its members have fully convertible currencies. 174 Swap Centers may
provide the means to achieve the partial convertibility that is necessary to solve
both domestic and international economic problems. Social costs, if a necessary
consequence of devaluation and inflation, should be counterbalanced by the
enhancement of export markets and foreign trade. In order to be successful, the
PRC must find ways of regulating foreign investment without stifling it alto-
gether, and Swap Centers in theory may serve to strike this tricky balance. In
practice, corruption has plagued the system and fueled the vision of more con-
servative economic planners who are supportive of closing the centers altogether.
Swap Centers should therefore be structured to regulate more effectively foreign-
invested, as well as domestic, enterprises in order to limit corruption and to




171. Special permission is required by Shanghai's mayor to take swapped money out of that city.
Ruwart, Swap center Setback, CHINA Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 5.
172. Id.
173. See supra text section II.B on purposes for which foreign exchange may be purchased. This
development is also noted in Ruwart, supra note 171.
174. Rowen, supra note 2.
SUMMER 1991
442 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
ernization. In this sense, the BSC provides a more sensible model than the
laissez-faire policies of certain Swap Centers in the SEZs. Furthermore, this
model may be useful to the USSR and to Eastern European nations and others
moving toward at least partial convertibility of local currency. Therefore, sinol-
ogists, sovietologists, economists, international lawyers, business people, and
others should keep their eye on the development of the Swap Center system in
the PRC and in future applications of this model elsewhere.
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